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In their recent article, Gabriel et al. (2013)
propose that the difficulty experienced
by Belgian children in learning fractions
stems from the fundamental dichotomy
of procedural and conceptual knowledge
of fractions. Indeed, the authors are not
alone in this conclusion, as the pro-
cedural/conceptual knowledge divide has
been a focus in several recent studies in
numerical cognition (Hallett et al., 2010;
Hecht and Vagi, 2012). Like their prede-
cessors, Gabriel et al. adopt the definitions
introduced by Rittle-Johnson and Alibali
(1999), where conceptual knowledge refers
to the understanding of the principles that
govern a knowledge domain and proce-
dural knowledge refers to knowledge of
specific actions that are used to solve prob-
lems. This work stems from a rich founda-
tion in mathematics education regarding
the roles of procedural and conceptual
knowledge in school-age children’s math-
ematical development (Hiebert, 1986).
The issue I wish to raise in this com-
mentary is not with the conclusions of
Gabriel et al. (2013), but rather a general
issue concerning the notion of conceptual
and procedural tasks in mathematics. One
of the difficulties is that a single task can
reflect both types of knowledge. Indeed,
consider the task of shading a geometric
object (such as a square) to reflect a given
fraction, say 3/4. This task appears from
the outset to reflect conceptual knowledge,
specifically since successful completion of
the task gives some indication of the par-
ticipant’s knowledge of part-whole rela-
tionships in fractions. But, consider the
alternative where a child is explicitly taught
to perform this shading by first break-
ing the square into four equal sections,
then shading three of the sections. Does
this constitute a demonstration of con-
ceptual knowledge? Or, does it reflect the
use procedural knowledge? Hallett et al.
(2010) would side with procedural knowl-
edge since the procedure was explicitly
taught to the child beforehand. Other
authors (Hecht and Vagi, 2012; Gabriel
et al., 2013) used this task and chose to
call it a conceptual task. I would argue
that the main question should not be
whether the task is procedural or concep-
tual, but instead whether the employed
strategy reflects the use of procedural or
conceptual knowledge.
A related issue arises in Figure 3d of
Gabriel et al. (2013). In this figure, a child
has represented the fraction 2/6 by shad-
ing two parts of a circle that has been
divided into six sections. The problem is
that the two shaded sections are much
larger than the four non-shaded sections,
and as a result, the shaded fraction is actu-
ally 1/2. While this is a common error
(and is apparently cross-cultural), it raises
an important question. Does this child
reflect conceptual understanding of frac-
tions? I would argue no, since a conceptual
understanding of the part-whole relation-
ship would include the knowledge that the
six parts should be equal in size. Of course,
others may interpret this differently, and
that is fine. My larger point is that it can
be argued either way, and as such, the
task does not define the knowledge that
is used. Rather, it is the strategy used to
complete the task that helps us make our
conclusions.
Another common example of a task
that can reflect both procedural and con-
ceptual knowledge is the magnitude com-
parison task (e.g., which fraction is larger:
1/3 or 3/5?). Both Gabriel et al. (2013)
and Hecht and Vagi (2012) termed this
a conceptual task, presumably because
it reflects the concept of fraction as a
number. Indeed, if participants are form-
ing mental representations of the frac-
tions’ magnitudes, then I feel that this is
likely an accurate description. However,
in a study with adults, Faulkenberry and
Pierce (2011) found that on approximately
25% of trials, participants used a strat-
egy known as cross-multiplication, where
the size judgement is made by comparing
cross-products (numerator of one fraction
multiplied by denominator of another).
This is a common procedural strategy that
is employed in US schools for teaching stu-
dents how to compare fractions (Boston
et al., 2003). More importantly, this pro-
cedure allows the participant to arrive at
an answer with no sense of the fraction
as a number (i.e., no conceptual knowl-
edge). Without explicitly asking partici-
pants to describe their solution strategy, it
would not have been clear that they were
using such a strategy, and by implication, it
would have been impossible to know that
they were using a procedural strategy on a
task that looked conceptual.
From here, it is clear that there is a fun-
damental inconsistency in the literature. I
think the proactive solution to this incon-
sistency lies in clearly delineating between
the notions of conceptual/procedural
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tasks and conceptual/procedural strate-
gies. Simply coining tasks as procedural
or conceptual does not appear to be
sufficient. Rather, we need some knowl-
edge of a participant’s solution strategy
to accurately determine which type of
knowledge is responsible for the solu-
tion. Admittedly, this can be difficult to
ascertain, as it requires interviewing par-
ticipants about their methods of solving
problems. While a trial-by-trial report of
strategies may be the gold standard in
this type of research, such data is time-
consuming to gather. More optimistically,
it may be possible to get a decent measure
of strategy to simply asking participants
post-hoc to simply describe how they
solve problems of a given type. At the
very least, tasks that are used in studies of
conceptual/procedural knowledge should
be subjected to at least two rounds of
independent ratings of to how they reflect
one type of knowledge or the other. This
was the approach used in Hallett et al.
(2010), and I feel that such data should
be minimally required in future studies of
this type.
In summary, I believe Gabriel et al.
(2013) have conducted an important study
in the field of numerical cognition of
fractions, particularly from the standpoint
that it (1) identifies an important short-
coming of early fraction knowledge that
appears to be cross-cultural, and it (2)
begins an important dialogue about the
methodological issues that we should
consider when investigating the nature
of conceptual and procedural knowledge
in mathematics. We should continue to
devote our time to serious investigations of
the factors that influence conceptual and
procedural knowledge in mathematics. At
the same time, we should acknowledge
that our current notion of labeling tasks
as procedural or conceptual is limited, and
that in the future we should investigate
whether strategies employed on these tasks
better reflect the use of procedural or con-
ceptual knowledge.
REFERENCES
Boston, M. D., Smith, M. S., and Hillen, A. F. (2003).
Building on students’ intuitive strategies to make
sense of cross multiplication. Math. Teach. Mid.
School 9, 150–155.
Faulkenberry, T. J., and Pierce, B. H. (2011).
Mental representations in fraction comparison:
holistic versus component-based strategies. Exp.
Psychol. 58, 480–489. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/
a000116
Gabriel, F., Coché, F., Szucs, D., Carette, V., Rey, B.,
and Content, A. (2013). A componential view of
children’s difficulties in learning fractions. Front.
Psychol. 4:715. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00715
Hallett, D., Nunes, T., and Bryant, P. (2010).
Individual differences in conceptual and procedu-
ral knowledge when learning fractions. J. Educ.
Psychol. 102, 395–406. doi: 10.1037/a0017486
Hecht, S. A., and Vagi, K. J. (2012). Patterns of
strengths and weaknesses in children’s knowl-
edge about fractions. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 111,
212–229. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2011.08.012
Hiebert, J. E. (1986). Conceptual and Procedural
knowledge: The Case of Mathematics. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Rittle-Johnson, B., and Alibali, M. W. (1999).
Conceptual and procedural knowledge of mathe-
matics: does one lead to the other? J. Educ. Psychol.
91, 175–189. doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.91.1.175
Received: 11 October 2013; accepted: 15 October 2013;
published online: 06 November 2013.
Citation: Faulkenberry TJ (2013) The concep-
tual/procedural distinction belongs to strategies, not
tasks: A comment on Gabriel et al. (2013). Front.
Psychol. 4:820. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00820
This article was submitted to Developmental Psychology,
a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Faulkenberry. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited
and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not
comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Developmental Psychology November 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 820 | 2
